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ABSTRACT	
The	paper	argues	that	focusing	only	on	disputes	formally	raised	in	the	WTO	Dispute	
Settlement	system	underestimates	the	extent	of	trade	conflict	resolution	within	the	
WTO.		Both	the	SPS	and	TBT	Committees	address	a	significant	number	of	‘specific	trade	
concerns’	ሺSTCsሻ	that	in	the	overwhelming	majority	of	cases	do	not	become	formal	
disputes.	The	STCs	address	differences	between	Members	concerning	the	conformity	of	
national	measures	in	the	SPS	and	TBT	areas	with	these	agreements.	It	appears	as	if	
Committee	work	on	STCs	significantly	helps	defuse	potential	trade	frictions	concerning	
national	policies	in	the	covered	areas.		
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1 Introduction	
A	central	task	of	the	WTO	TBT	and	SPS	Committees	is	to	administer	‘specific	trade	
concerns’	ሺSTCsሻ	that	Members	raise	before	them.	STCs	are	not	formal	disputes	in	the	
legal	sense	of	the	term,	i.e.,	they	are	not	disputes	raised	before	Panels/AB	as	per	§1	of	
the	Dispute	Settlement	Understanding	ሺDSUሻ.	They	are	not	even	the	necessary	ante‐
chambre	for	lodging	a	dispute	under	the	proceedings	of	the	DSU,	since	Members	do	not	
have	to	bring	their	concerns	to	the	Committee	before	lodging	a	formal	DSU	dispute.		
Members	can	bring	STCs	simply	to	seek	information	concerning	other	Members’	
national	measures	in	the	areas	covered	by	the	Agreement	on	Technical	Barriers	to	Trade	
ሺTBTሻ,	or	the	Agreement	on	the	Application	of	Sanitary	and	Phytosanitary	Measures	
ሺSPSሻ.	But	STCs	also	very	often	address	divergences	of	views	between	Members	
regarding	the	consistency	of	national	measures	in	SPS	and	TBT	areas	with	these	
agreements.		By	raising	STCs,	Members	often	are	not	only	requesting	information	or	
clarification;	they	also	send	a	strong	signal	that	they	already	have	reasons	to	believe	that	
obligations	under	the	agreements	have	not	been	met.				
	
The	purpose	of	the	paper	is	to	argue	that	this	work	on	STCs	is	akin	to	an	informal	form	
of	resolution	of	trade	conflicts	that	operates	in	parallel	to	the	Dispute	Settlement	
mechanism	and	covers	a	broad	range	of	non‐tariff	barriers	of	a	regulatory	nature.		The	
paper	sheds	light	on	the	nature	and	quantitative	importance	of	this	mode	of	conflict	
resolution.		Based	on	the	fact	that	several	hundred	STCs	of	this	nature	have	been	
discussed	since	1995,	we	conclude	that	the	STC	mechanism	significantly	contributes	to	
defusing	trade	tensions	in	the	SPS	and	TBT	areas.	Although	it	is	difficult	to	point	to	the	
specific	reasons	why	the	Committees	have	been	successful	in	this	regard,	we	argue	that	
its	practical,	expert	driven	approach	is	most	likely	one	important	contributing	factor.	
	
It	should	be	emphasized	that	the	interpretation	of	the	Committee	work	on	STCs	as	
means	of	resolving	trade	conflicts	is	not	self‐evident:	the	Committees	are	formally	only	
fora	for	Members	to	share	knowledge	about	each	other’s	policy	measures	in	the	SPS	and	
TBT	areas.	But	there	are	at	least	two	reasons	why	we	believe	it	is	appropriate	to	
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describe	the	Committees	work	as	actually	resolving	trade	conflicts.	First,	in	the	SPS	area	
many	STCs	are	reported	officially	as	‘partially	resolved’	or	‘resolved’;	the	absence	of	an	
explicit	reference	to	‘resolutions’	on	the	TBT	side	has	not	hindered	‘settlements’	on	that	
area	as	well,	as	we	will	argue	infra.	Second,	in	both	the	SPS	and	TBT	areas,	a	large	
number	of	STCs	have	been	discussed	in	several	meetings,	e.g.	they	are	not	mere	requests	
for	clarification,	to	eventually	disappear	from	the	agenda.	These	issues	are	very	rarely	
subsequently	raised	as	formal	disputes	under	the	DSU.	It	appears	hence,	that	the	
Committees	effectively	contribute	to	defusing	or	preempting	these	conflicts	between	
WTO	Members.		
	
Section	2	provides	background	information	concerning	the	Committees.	Section	3	
focuses	on	the	key	instrument	for	ensuring	transparency	in	both	Committees:	
‘notifications’.		Section	4	examines	basic	features	of	the	two	Committees'	handling	of	
STCs.	It	discusses	the	use	of	the	STC	mechanism	over	time,	characterizes	the	type	of	
Members	that	raise	and	respond	to	such	concerns,	and	it	shows	that	a	significant	part	of	
these	STCs	address	measures	that	are	about	the	protection	of	human	health	or	safety,	or	
the	protection	of	the	environment.		Section	5	focuses	on	the	extent	to	which	STCs	are	
‘resolved’.		Section	6	concludes.	
2 The	Role	of	the	SPS/TBT	Committees	
This	Section	briefly	discusses	the	institutional	role	of	the	SPS	and	TBT	Committees	
within	the	WTO.	
2.1 The	Discipline	in	Brief	
The	TBT	and	SPS	agreements	seek	to	strike	a	balance	between	the	WTO	Members’	right	
to	take	measures	for	the	achievement	of	legitimate	policy	objectives	ሺsuch	as	the	
protection	of	human,	animal	or	plant	life	or	health	or	the	protection	of	the	environmentሻ	
and	the	need	to	discipline	this	right	in	order	to	avoid	the	emergence	of	unnecessary	
trade	barriers.	Measures	need	to	be	non‐discriminatory	and	necessary	to	achieve	the	
stated	objective;	in	the	SPS	context,	Members	need,	in	principle,	to	base	their	measures	
on	science,	and	they	also	need	to	be	consistent	when	formulating	and	applying	measures	
coming	under	the	purview	of	this	Agreement.	The	two	agreements	do	not	impose	
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common	policies	on	Members,	but	there	is	a	strong	encouragement	for	WTO	Members	
to	use	international	standards	as	a	basis	for	regulation.		There	is	a	presumption	
ሺrebuttableሻ	that	if	a	Member	bases	its	measure	on	an	international	standard	it	is	not	
creating	an	unnecessary	barrier	to	trade.		
	
The	scope	of	measures	covered	by	the	two	agreements	is	wide.		The	TBT	Agreement	
applies	to	regulatory	non‐tariff	measures:		these	measures	are	referred	to	as	‘technical	
regulations’,	‘standards’,	and	‘conformity	assessment	procedures’.	SPS	measures	address	
a	set	of	specific	risks	that	international	trade	brings	to	human,	animal	and	plant	life	or	
health.1		There	is	no	overlap	between	the	Agreements	with	regard	to	scope,	i.e.,	a	given	
measure	cannot	be	covered	by	both	agreements.2		
	
Both	 industrial	 and	 agricultural	 products	 fall	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 TBT	 and	 SPS	
Agreements.	But	in	practice	there	is	a	strong	dominance	of	agricultural	products	in	the	
SPS	area:	 	 for	 instance,	94%	of	all	products	addressed	 in	 trade	concerns	raised	before	
the	SPS	Committee	affect	trade	in	agricultural	products.3	 	This	reflects	the	fact	that	the	
SPS	Agreement	is	focused	on	risks	related	to	food	safety,	plant	and	animal	health	–	and	
that	the	Agreement	was,	at	 least	to	some	extent,	negotiated	to	ensure	that	concessions	
made	 on	 domestic	 support	 and	 market	 access	 under	 the	 1995	 WTO	 Agreement	 on	
Agriculture	would	not	be	undermined	by	other	types	of	non‐tariff	barriers.	For	the	TBT	
Agreement,	about	30%	of	the	products	affected	by	trade	concerns	raised	for	discussion	
                                                 
1 These are measures applied address risks:  (i) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the 
Member from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms 
or disease-causing organisms;  (ii) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member 
from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or 
feedstuffs;  (iii) to protect human life or health within the territory of the  Member from risks arising from 
diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread of pests;  or 
(iv) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the  Member from the entry, establishment or spread 
of pests.  A footnote to the word  ‘Definitions’ in  Annex A of the SPS Agreement states that for the purpose of 
these definitions, ‘animal’ includes fish and wild fauna;  ‘plant’ includes forests and wild flora;  ‘pests’ include 
weeds;  and ‘contaminants’ include pesticide and veterinary drug residues and extraneous matter  (SPS  
Agreement, Annex A, Definitions, para 1). 
 
2 TBT §1.5 and SPS §1.4. 
 
3 WTO WTR 2012, Section C.2(d), p.116.  This reflects data from 1995 – 2011 and for those STCs in the SPS 
IMS database where there was sufficient information to identify products (approximately 85% for both SPS and 
TBT STCs). 
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are	in	the	agricultural	sector,	and	the	rest	in	other	sectors.		Overall,	trade	in	farm	goods	
emerges	as	the	single	most	important	area	where	STCs	are	being	raised.	
2.2 The	Mandate	of	the	Committees	
The	implementation	of	the	TBT	Agreement	is	supervised	by	the	TBT	Committee,	which	
was	formally	established	with	the	purpose	of:	
	
…affording	Members	the	opportunity	of	consulting	on	any	matters	relating	
to	the	operation	of	this	Agreement	or	the	furtherance	of	its	objectives,	and	
shall	carry	out	such	responsibilities	as	assigned	to	it	under	this	Agreement	
or	by	the	Members.4	
	
For	the	SPS	Agreement,	the	relevant	mandate	reads:	
	
The	Committee	shall	encourage	and	facilitate	ad	hoc	consultations	or	
negotiations	among	Members	on	specific	sanitary	of	phytosanitary	issues.5		
	
For	SPS,	the	procedural	vehicle	necessary	to	facilitate	consultations	between	WTO	
Members	–	STCs	–	was	supplied	through	the	Working	Procedures	of	the	SPS	Committee	
which	were	adopted	in	March	1995	and	provide:	
	
With	respect	to	any	matter	which	has	been	raised	under	the	Agreement,	the	
Chairperson	may,	at	the	request	of	the	Members	directly	concerned,	assist	
them	in	dealing	with	the	matter	in	question.	The	Chairperson	shall	
normally	report	to	the	Committee	on	the	general	outcome	with	respect	to	
the	matter	in	question.6	
	
                                                 
4 TBT §13.1. 
5 SPS §12.2. 
6 WTO Doc. G/SPS/1 of March 15, 1995, paragraph 5. 
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In	TBT,	the	discussion	of	STCs	evolved	over	time	and	it	was	only	relatively	recently	ሺin	
2009ሻ	that	the	Committee	formalized	the	procedure	for	discussion	STCs	–	essentially	in	
an	effort	to	cope	with	a	growing	agenda.		At	that	point	delegates	in	the	TBT	Committee,	
noting	the	‘accelerated	growth’	in	the	number	of	specific	trade	concerns	raised,	as	well	
as	the	number	of	Members	engaging	in	the	discussion,	agreed	on	a	set	of	guidelines	ሺe.g.,	
sequencing	and	time	limitsሻ	to	streamline	the	process	so	as	to	make	it	efficient	and	to	
‘secure	a	more	prompt	response	to	concerns	raised’.7		
	
In	sum,	based	on	rather	simple	mandates,	over	time	both	Committees	have	developed	
pragmatic	procedures	that	enable	delegations	to	use	the	WTO	as	a	platform	for	the	
multilateral	review	of	both	draft	and	existing	measures	of	a	regulatory	nature.	8	
3 Notifications	
Both	the	TBT	and	SPS	agreements	contain	elaborate	transparency	requirements.		The	
basic	instrument	for	transparency	is	a	‘notification’.9		Members	are	required	to	‘notify’	
other	WTO	Members	ሺthrough	the	WTO	Secretariatሻ	of	draft	regulations	ሺtechnical	
regulations	or	conformity	assessment	proceduresሻ,	before	they	enter	into	force.	A	
‘notification’	is	in	practice	a	one	or	two	page	document	that	reflects	forthcoming	
regulation	affecting	trade	ሺincreasingly	they	also	contain	hyperlinks	to	the	actual	full	
draft	of	the	proposed	measureሻ.		Two	important	caveats	should	be	made	at	this	point:	ሺiሻ	
Members	only	have	an	obligation	to	notify	measures	that	may	have	a	significant	effect	
                                                 
7 WTO Doc. G/TBT/1/Rev.10, page 43. 
8 Puig and al Haddab (2011). 
9 There are, of course, other aspects of transparency covered by these two Agreements parallel to notificaiton 
requirements.  For instance, Members have to establish ‘enquiry points’ (TBT §10.1 and SPS Annex B, §3) 
which serve as national focal points for information exchange on standards and regulatory matters that affect 
trade.  Enquiry points are meant to be one stop shops to facilitate communication both within and among 
countries on TBT and SPS matters. Traders can ask questions about both existing as well as future measures and 
obtain information without implicating their governments at all (unlike the paradigm for the overwhelming 
majority of WTO law). Biukovic (2008), and Bacchetta et al. (2012) discuss in detail the system of WTO 
notifications. Transparency obligations increasingly become the subject-matter of formal disputes. So far 
nevertheless, case law has limited itself to claims regarding the consistency of national measures with the general 
transparency obligation embedded in Art. X GATT, see Ala’I (2008). 
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on	trade,	and	ሺiiሻ	measures	that	are	not	based	on	an	international	standard.10		In	
practice,	several	Members	tend	to	err	on	the	side	of	caution,	notifying	more	measures	
that	actually	would	be	strictly	necessary	to	notify.	
	
Notifications	should	happen	at	an	early	stage	of	the	national	legislative	process,	when	
amendments	can	still	be	introduced	and	comments	can	be	taken	into	account	ሺby	the	
regulatorሻ.	Over	the	years,	substantial	time	has	been	spent	developing	and	refining	
recommendations	aimed	at	facilitating	the	practical	implementation	of	the	transparency	
requirements.	Concrete	proposals	regarding	the	deadline	for	comments,	the	circulation	
of	full	draft	texts	have	been	made	and	practice	has	evolved	along	these	lines.		
	
Figure	1	depicts	the	evolution	of	the	number	of	SPS	and	TBT	notifications	over	the	
period	1995‐2012.		Since	the	entry	into	force	of	the	agreement	in	January	1995	until	the	
end	of	2012,	15,736	TBT	notifications	have	been	made	by	116	Members	of	the	WTO.		For	
the	SPS	Agreement,	during	the	same	period,	11,275	measures	have	been	notified	by	108	
Members.11	The	number	of	notifications	from	developing	country	members	is	also	rising	
steadily.	Figure	1	does	not	purport	to	address	the	extent	to	which	WTO	Members	live	up	
to	the	notification	requirements,	since	this	would	require	that	we	know	the	total	
number	of	draft	measures	that	should	be	notified.12		We	can	still	conclude	that	in	
absolute	terms,	there	is	clear	trend	toward	an	increasing	number	of	notifications	for	
both	SPS	and	TBT	measures.13	
	
	
                                                 
10 SPS §7 and Annex B, §5 and TBT §2.9 and §5.6.  The presumption is that those measures that are based on 
international standards will not unnecessarily restrict international trade. 
11 These figures includes all notifications (both regular and emergency), including revisions – but excluding 
addenda and corrigenda.  For TBT, the figures are drawn from G/TBT/33, paragraph 2.1.  For SPS, the figures 
are drawn from I-TIP (http://i-tip.wto.org/). 
12 As Collin-Williams and Wolffe (2010) point out, since notification of TBT or SPS measures is not necessarily 
self-incriminating, Members should have stronger incentives to notify these than e.g. subsidies or import 
licensing measures. Downs (2012) argues that transparency may also lead to regulatory chill and under-
regulation where doubts are raised on the consistency of notified measure with assumed obligations. 
 
13 WTO TBT IMS database (http://tbtims.wto.org/).   
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Figure	1:	The	number	of	all	new	SPS	notifications	and	TBT	notifications	
	
	
4 Specific	Trade	Concerns	ሺSTCsሻ	
We	will	now	examine	the	frequency	and	nature	of	STCs.14	To	this	end	we	will	employ	a	
data	set	that	includes	all	STCs	raised	in	meetings	of	the	SPS	and	TBT	Committees	from	
1995	to	2012.15			We	begin	by	discussing	who	participates	in	STCs	in	the	Committee	and	
then	we	will	take	a	closer	look	at	the	numbers	and	the	nature	of	the	STCs	themselves.	
                                                 
14 Lang and Scott (2009) discuss STCs from a different perspective, for instance pointing to how this mechanism 
promotes trans-national governance.  
 
15 Data is taken from TBT and SPS Information Management Systems (tbtims.wto.org and spsims.wto.org). 
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4.1 The	participants	in	STCs	
The	most	frequent	type	of	concern	is	purely	bilateral	in	nature	ሺit	arises	between	two	
Membersሻ:	about	half	of	all	STCs	ሺboth	SPS	and	TBTሻ	involve	one	Member	addressing	a	
measure	pursued	by	one	other	Member.	In	40%	of	the	cases	there	are	between	2	and	5	
concerned	Members	ሺe.g.	WTO	Members	that	have	raised	a	concern	against	a	specific	
measure	adopted	by	another	WTO	Memberሻ,	in	7%	there	are	between	6	and	10	
concerned	Members,	and	in	3%	more	than	10	concerned	Members.	With	respect	to	
frequency,	usually,	STCs	are	raised	and	discussed	within	a	few	ሺsuccessiveሻ	meetings	of	
the	relevant	Committee.	There	are	a	few	outliers	in	this	regard.	The	most	extreme	is	the	
STC	concerning	the	EU	REACH	Regulation	ሺchemicalsሻ.	The	protection	of	human	health	
or	safety,	as	well	as	the	protection	of	the	environment,	are	among	the	stated	objectives	
being	pursued	by	the	European	Union	ሺEUሻ	through	the	REACH	regulation.		This	case	
has	been	on	the	TBT	agenda	for	over	10	years,	and	more	than	30	Members	have	been	
involved	so	far	in	the	on‐going	discussions.	The	absence	of	resolution	after	10	years	
notwithstanding,	this	STC	has	not	been	submitted	to	formal	dispute	settlement.16	
	
Figures	8	and	9	depict	the	ten	most	active	Members	raising	STCs	in	the	SPS	and	TBT	
Committees.	As	can	be	seen,	there	is	a	high	degree	of	overlap:	the	same	8	countries	are	
among	the	10	most	active	in	both	Committees.	The	EU	and	the	US	dominate,	each	
accounting	for	twice	as	many	STCs	than	the	third	most	active	country.		
	
Figure	8:	Members	that	most	frequently	launch	SPS	STCs		
                                                 
16 REACH is the European Union Regulation that governs the safe use of chemicals (EC 1907/2006). It entered 
into force on 1 June 2007 and deals with the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemical 
substances (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/reach/reach_intro.htm).  It was first raised in the TBT 
Committee in March 2003 and, at was, at the time or writing, to be raised in March 2013. 
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Figure	9:	Members	that	most	frequently	launch	TBT	STCs	
	
	
On	the	responding	side	ሺFigures	10	and	11ሻ,	the	picture	is	fairly	similar,	with	a	total	of	
13	Members	featuring.	But	a	striking	feature	is	the	almost	complete	dominance	by	the	
EU,	which	is	the	target	of	more	than	40%	of	the	concerns	raised	in	both	the	SPS	and	the	
TBT	Committee.	The	EU	has	faced	more	than	four	times	as	many	STCs	in	the	SPS	area,	
compared	to	the	next	most	often	responding	country,	Australia,	and	almost	four	times	as	
many	on	the	TBT	side,	where	China	is	the	second	most	active.		
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Figure	10:	Members	that	most	frequently	face	SPS	STCs	
	
	
Figure	11:	Members	that	most	frequently	face	TBT	STCs	
	
	
To	shed	some	light	on	who	is	concerned	by	whose	measures,	we	first	classify	WTO	
Members	into	five	broad	groups:17	
	
G2:		 The	EU,	and	the	United	States	ሺUSሻ	
IND:		 Other	industrialized	countries	
BRIC:		 Brazil,	Russia,	India	and	China	
                                                 
17 Appendix 1 gives a complete classification of all WTO Members that have participated on either side of an 
SPS or TBT STC according to these five categories. 
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DEV:		 Developing	countries	other	than	LDC	
LDC:		 Least	developed	countries		
	
In	this	classification,	the	definition	of	EU	follows	the	actual	enlargement.	The	group	IND	
consists	of	OECD	Members,	the	non‐OECD	Members	among	the	12	countries	that	most	
recently	became	members	of	the	EU,	those	that	are	currently	at	an	advanced	stage	of	
their	accession	negotiations,	as	well	as	countries	that	are	not	OECD	Members	but	have	a	
very	high	per	capita	income,	such	as	Singapore.	Russia	is	included	in	the	BRIC	group	
despite	not	being	a	WTO	Member	during	most	of	the	period	covered	by	the	data	set,	
since	it	used	its	Observer	status	to	appear	as	complainant	in	the	TBT	Committee.	We	use	
the	classification	by	the	United	Nations	to	identify	the	LDC	group.	The	DEV	group	
consists	of	all	countries	which	do	not	fit	into	either	of	the	above	mentioned	categories.		
	
Second,	in	order	to	quantify	the	frequencies	of	different	constellations	of	concerned	and	
responding	countries,	we	need	to	address	the	fact	that	there	may	be	several	concerned	
countries,	and	these	countries	may	belong	to	different	country	groups.	We	will	therefore	
rely	on	the	notion	of	a	‘bilateral	STC’.	The	basic	idea	behind	this	approach	is	to	view	
STCs	between	WTO	Members	at	a	bilateral	level.	That	is,	if	two	Members	are	concerned	
about	a	measure	undertaken	by	a	third	Member,	we	count	each	one	of	them	having	a	
‘bilateral	STC’	with	the	third	Member.	We	do	this	not	only	to	solve	the	problem	of	how	to	
classify	STCs	where	countries	stem	from	different	country	groups,	but	also	since	we	
believe	that	the	‘packaging’	of	such	bilateral	relational	problems	into	one	administrative	
unit,	an	STC,	tends	to	hide	information	concerning	the	extent	of	conflict	between	
different	Members.	It	should	be	emphasized	that	there	is	no	single	correct	definition;	the	
appropriate	definition	is	determined	by	the	question	that	the	data	is	to	answer.	As	a	
consequence	of	the	conversion	of	STCs	into	bilateral	STCs	as	the	unit	of	account,	the	
number	of	observations	in	the	data	set	is	increased	from	710	to	1,940.	
	
For	many	STCs	and	especially	some	notorious	cases	ሺe.g.,	the	EU	REACH	mentioned	
aboveሻ,	when	the	issue	is	raised	by	one	Member	in	the	Committee,	others	‘support’	the	
concern	raised.	It	seems	plausible	that	in	some	cases,	the	supporting	countries	are	not	as	
deeply	involved	in	the	dispute	as	the	country	initiating	the	STC.	But	in	the	data	we	have	
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no	definition	of	‘co‐complainant’,	or	even	‘third	party’,	à	la	Arts.	4.11	and	10	DSU	
respectively,	that	we	would	allow	us	to	distinguish	between	different	degrees	of	
involvement	whenever	STCs	are	raised.	We	therefore	count	all	countries	that	are	
involved	in	STCs,	as	being	equally	involved	in	an	STC.		
	
Tables	1a	and	1b	display	the	breakdown	of	respectively	SPS	STCs	and	TBT	STCs	on	the	
different	possible	ሺconcerned	Member,	responding	Memberሻ	categories.	The	pattern	is	
fairly	similar	across	the	two	policy	areas.	There	are	a	couple	of	noteworthy	features,	
however.		
	
Table	1a:	Who	is	concerned	with	whom	in	SPS	STCs?	
	 	 RESPONDENT
CONCERNED	
	 BRIC DEV G2 IND Total	
BRIC 0.4 0.3 7.53 1.0 9.3
DEV	 2.9 3.3 13.3 4.3 23.8	
G2	 11.0 9.4 5.05 8.3 33.7	
IND	 6.1 5.8 13.51 6.7 32.1	
LDC	 0.3 0.0 0 0.8 1.1
	 Total 20.7 18.8 39.38 21.1 100.0%	
	
	
Table	1b:	Who	is	concerned	with	whom	in	TBT	STCs?	
	
	 	 RESPONDENT
CONCERNED	
	 BRIC DEV G2 IND LDC Total	
BRIC	 0.6 2.3 5.8 3.5 0.1 12.3	
DEV	 1.5 4.8 17.5 8.2 0.0 32.0	
G2	 4.8 7.6 4.5 8.8 0.0 25.6	
IND	 2.7 8.4 7.3 11.0 0.0 29.4	
LDC	 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.7	
	 Total	 9.5 23.1 35.6 31.6 0.1 100.0%	
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First,	the	share	of	intra‐G2	STCs	is	very	low:	less	than	5%	in	both	cases.		This	is	in	sharp	
contrast	with	the	number	of	intra‐G2	disputes	before	the	DSU:	G2	targets	G2	in	close	to	
36%	of	its	total	complaints,	whereas	intra‐G2	complaints	represent	as	high	as	15%	of	
total	complaints	raised	before	the	DSU.18	The	numbers	quoted	here	seem	to	suggest	that	
the	intra‐G2	disputes	do	not	concern	regulatory	barriers,	the	presence	of	high‐profile	
cases	ሺsuch	as	EC‐Hormonesሻ	notwithstanding.	This	is	confirmed	by	a	detailed	look	into	
the	profile	of	G2	disputes	before	the	DSU.19	Additionally,	this	number	lends	support	to	
findings	in	the	literature	to	the	effect	that	regulatory	barriers	raised	in	the	G2	most	
likely	affect	developing	countries.20		
	
A	second	striking	feature	is	that	the	most	common	constellation	is	that	a	DEV	country	
raises	a	concern	with	a	G2	country	measure,	and	this	despite	the	fact	that	a	number	of	
countries	that	classify	themselves	as	‘developing’	in	the	WTO,	such	as	Mexico,	South	
Korea,	and	Turkey,	have	been	included	in	the	IND	group,	and	there	is	a	separate	BRIC	
group.	
		
Third,	for	SPS	STCs,	the	DEV	group	is	significantly	more	often	on	the	side	of	the	
concerned	country	rather	than	the	responding	country,	while	the	role	of	G2	is	the	
opposite.	The	picture	is	somewhat	different	for	TBT	however,	where	this	
‘overrepresentation’	of	DEV	as	concerned	Member	is	slightly	smaller.	Instead,	the	IND	
group	appears	significantly	more	frequently	as	concerned	rather	than	as	responding	
country,	and	the	same	holds	for	the	BRIC	group.	
	
The	picture	that	emerges	is	thus	that	the	SPS	and	TBT	Committees	offer	arenas	where	
developing	countries	ሺother	than	LDCsሻ	are	more	active	than	their	share	of	trade	would	
suggest,	requesting	clarifications	concerning	measures,	and	perhaps	also	resolving	
problems	with,	in	particular,	more	affluent	countries.		
                                                 
18Horn et al. (2011).  
19Horn et al. (2011).  
20Wilson and Otsuki (2005).  
 14 
 
4.2 The	number	of	STCs	
Figure	2	displays	the	evolution	of	the	number	of	new	SPS	and	TBT	STCs	raised	each	year.		
This	does	not	fully	reflect	the	number	of	STCs	that	are	discussed	every	year	because	
Members	frequently	revert	to	STCs	that	have	been	raised	on	previous	occasions	–	
indeed	more	time	is	usually	spent	raising	new	aspects	or	requesting	further	clarification	
with	respect	to	such	previously	raised	concerns.		The	second	time	an	STC	is	raised,	
discussions	often	tend	to	widen	as	other	Members	get	involved.	
	
Figure	2:	The	number	of	new	SPS	and	TBT	STCs	
	
	
Figure	2	shows	that	the	number	of	TBT	STCs	has	increased	steadily	over	the	whole	
period;	for	instance,	the	average	yearly	number	of	TBT	STCs	during	the	first	nine	years	
of	the	WTO,	1995‐2003,	was	11.3,	while	the	following	nine	years	the	yearly	average	was	
29.1	STCs.21	The	picture	is	similar	for	SPS	STCs	during	the	first	period,	for	which	there	is	
                                                 
21 Approximating the development of the TBT STCs with a linear trend, the yearly increase in the number of 
TBT STCs is slightly over 2.  
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an	upward	trend,	albeit	not	as	steady	as	for	TBT	STCs.	But	after	the	record	year	2002,	
the	number	of	SPS	STCs	has	declined.22		
	
The	diverging	use	of	the	STC	mechanism	in	the	two	Committees	is	difficult	to	explain.	A	
comparison	with	Figure	1	shows	that	the	fall	in	the	number	of	SPS	STCs	in	the	second	
half	of	the	period	cannot	be	attributed	to	a	falling	number	of	SPS	notifications,	since	they	
have	steadily	increased	throughout	the	period	ሺwe	will	return	to	the	relationship	
between	notifications	and	STCs	belowሻ.	In	light	of	the	fact	that	each	of	the	four	years	
2001‐2005	saw	more	SPS	STCs	than	any	year	thereafter,	it	does	not	seem	to	be	
randomness	either.		
	
It	can	also	be	noted	that	in	the	year	of	the	spectacular	fall	in	world	trade,	2009,	the	
number	of	TBT	STCs	was	more	than	twice	the	average	of	the	preceding	six	years	ሺ46	
compared	to	an	average	of	approximately	20.7	during	2003‐2008ሻ.	On	the	other	hand,	
the	number	of	SPS	STCs	was	below	the	average	during	this	period.	
4.2.1 STCs	and	notifications	
Members	can	initiate	STCs	concerning	both	measures	that	have	been	notified	and	those	
that	have	not.		Indeed,	on	occasion,	the	very	fact	that	a	measure	has	not	been	notified	is	
the	reason	that	a	Member	raises	the	matter	in	the	Committee.		Although	the	data	does	
not	tell	us	to	what	extent,	it	seems	plausible	that	notifications	provide	important	
information	to	other	Members	about	measures	that	are	in	the	draft	stage.		There	should,	
thus,	be	a	positive	correlation	between	the	number	of	notifications,	and	the	number	of	
STCs.	To	shed	light	on	this	relationship,	Figure	3	combines	the	data	underlying	Figures	1	
and	2,	showing	the	number	of	STCs	relative	to	the	number	of	notifications.		
	
	
	
	
	
                                                 
22 The correlation coefficient is .88 during the period 1995-2003 and -.63 during 2004-2012. 
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Figure	3:	The	number	of	STCs	as	per	cent	of	the	number	of	notifications	
	
A	number	of	observations	can	be	made	on	basis	of	Figure	3.		First,	the	number	of	STCs	is	
typically	much	lower	than	the	number	of	notifications:	in	the	case	of	the	TBT	Committee,	
the	ratio	between	the	number	of	notifications	and	the	number	of	STCs	is	on	average	less	
than	3%,	and	it	is	maximally	5%.		For	SPS	STCs,	the	ratio	is	on	average	below	4%,	but	
with	a	maximum	value	above	8%.		However,	in	both	cases,	for	most	of	the	years	the	
fraction	on	both	the	SPS	and	the	TBT	sides	is	less	than	5%.	Hence,	the	number	of	STCs	is	
typically	a	small	fraction	of	the	number	of	notifications.	This	is	not	surprising	as	such,	
since	Members	have,	with	some	exclusion,	an	obligation	to	notify	all	new	or	changed	
measures	and	most	of	the	notified	measures	are	unproblematic.			
	
Second,	looking	at	the	development	over	time,	the	TBT	series	is	fairly	stable,	reflecting	
the	high	degree	of	correlation	ሺ.83ሻ	between	the	number	of	TBT	notifications	and	the	
number	of	TBT	STCs.	However,	on	the	SPS	side,	there	is	more	variability.	The	correlation	
between	the	number	of	SPS	notifications	and	the	number	of	SPS	STCs	is	also	low	ሺ.16ሻ.	
These	observations	seem	to	suggest	that	in	the	TBT	Committee,	notifications	serve	an	
important	role	to	provide	information	that	leads	up	to	STCs.	But	on	the	SPS	side,	other	
sources	than	notifications	may	as	well	drive	STCs.		
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4.2.2 STCs	and	DSU	disputes	
Yet	another	interesting	comparison	is	between	the	number	of	STCs	and	the	use	of	the	
Dispute	Settlement	ሺDSሻ	system.	Figure	4	illustrates	the	total	number	of	disputes	that	
have	been	initiated	in	the	DS	system	along	with	those	disputes	in	which	the	SPS	or	the	
TBT	Agreement	have	been	invoked.		The	figure	plots	the	number	of	instances	where	at	
least	one	claim	has	been	made	under	the	TBT	and/or	the	SPS	Agreement	in	disputes	
since	1995.		For	SPS,	the	total	number	of	disputes	is	40,	for	TBT	it	is	and	45.		It	should	be	
noted	that	in	most	of	these	disputes,	the	claims	under	the	SPS	and	TBT	Agreements	are	
not	at	the	core	of	the	legal	issue.	The	number	of	‘fully‐fledged’	SPS	and	TBT	DSU	disputes	
is	11	for	SPS,	and	5	for	TBT	ሺAppendix	2ሻ.	23		
	
Figure	4:	DSU	disputes,	total	number,	SPS	and	TBT	
	
A	key	observation	here	is	that	that	seen	over	the	whole	period	since	the	inception	of	the	
DSU	there	is	a	trend	towards	fewer	SPS	and	TBT	disputes	in	the	DS	system.	This	mirrors	
the	trend	toward	fewer	requests	for	consultations	in	the	Dispute	Settlement	system	
generally.	These	developments	stand	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	increase	in	the	number	of	
                                                 
23 By ‘fully-fledged’ we mean disputes where Panel and/or Appellate Body Reports have been issued and where 
the findings are concentrated on either the SPS or TBT Agreements.  These disputes are listed in Appendix 2. 
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TBT	STCs.		But	it	is	harder	to	infer	any	pattern	from	a	comparison	of	SPS	STCs	and	SPS	
disputes	in	the	DS	system.		
4.3 The	role	of	protection	of	human	health	or	safety	and	the	protection	of	the	
environment	in	STCs	
Most	of	the	issues	that	are	discussed	in	the	Committees	are	technical	in	nature,	and	often	
concern	detailed	provisions	of	proposed	or	implemented	regulations.	For	instance,	on	
the	TBT	side	they	may	relate	to	the	specifics	of	a	definition	ሺe.g.,	on	the	alcohol	content	
of	additives	to	alcoholic	productsሻ,	or	to	a	particular	tolerance	level	for	a	chemical	or	
toxic	substance	ሺe.g.,	lead	in	paint	used	on	toysሻ,	or	to	the	effects	of	a	particular	additive	
in	tobacco	–	to	give	a	few	examples.	Equally,	for	SPS,	the	focus	may	be	on	maximum	
pesticide	limits	ሺon	agricultural	cropsሻ	or	the	risk	of	transmitting	plant	or	animal	carried	
diseases	through	trade	in	animals,	plants	or	other	living	materials.		Hence,	the	term	
‘specific’	is	not	taken	out	of	the	blue;	it	indicates	that	the	concern	in	practice	often	has	a	
precise	as	opposed	to	abstract	content.			
	
Hence,	the	specific	and	often	very	complex	nature	of	measures	raised	in	the	Committees	
make	them	hard	to	categorize.		One	way	to	do	this	is	to	use	their	stated	regulatory	
objectives,	which	most	often	has	been	explicitly	mentioned.		For	measures	that	are	
discussed	in	Committee,	the	stated	objective	is	most	often	apparent	from	the	discussion.	
In	addition,	for	those	measures	that	are	notified	ሺas	mentioned	above,	not	all	measures	
that	are	subject	to	discussion	have	been	notifiedሻ,	the	objective	is	explicitly	stated	in	the	
notification	itself.	
	
In	what	follows	we	will	highlight	the	role	of	two	of	the	most	prominent	objectives—
protection	of	human	health	or	safety,	and	the	protection	of	the	environment.		These	
objectives	are	listed	as	such	in	the	TBT	Agreement,	and	we	therefore	have	information	
from	the	TBT	STCs	whether	the	STCs	address	measures	at	least	allegedly	pursue	these	
objectives.24			
                                                 
24 It is notable that in the year 2012 alone, 1,023 notifications under the TBT Agreement mentioned the objective 
of the ‘protection of human health or safety’ (66% of all notifications); for ‘protection of the environment’ the 
corresponding figure is 253 (16% of all notifications).  WTO Doc. G/TBT/33, page 4. 
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But	while	the	protection	of	human	health	is	also	explicit	in	the	SPS	Agreement	ሺfood	
safety	or	zoonosisሻ,	classifying	SPS	measures	according	to	their	relevance	for	
environmental	protection	is	not	as	straight	forward.		This	is	mainly	because	the	SPS	
Agreement	was	crafted	with	a	specific	focus	on	a	set	of	circumscribed	risks	for	human,	
animal	and	plant	life	or	health.		So	while	the	agreement	does	not	explicitly	refer	to	the	
protection	of	the	environment,	many	of	the	measures	coming	under	its	purview	are	
effectively	relevant	to	the	protection	of	environment	either	predominantly	so,	or	as	well.			
We	will	count	the	following	types	of	measures	to	be	relevant	to	the	protection	of	
environment:		ሺaሻ	measures	aiming	to	protect	plant	life	or	health	within	the	territory	of	
the	Member	from	risks	arising	from	the	entry,	establishment	or	spread	of	pests,	
diseases,	disease‐carrying	organisms	or	disease‐causing	organisms;	and	ሺbሻ	measures	
taken	to	prevent	or	limit	other	damage	within	the	territory	of	the	Member	from	the	
entry,	establishment	or	spread	of	pests.	25		We	believe	that	with	this	approach,	although	
we	are	most	likely	under‐estimating	the	total	number	of	measures	that	are	relevant	to	
the	protection	of	the	environment,	had	we	also	included	measures	relevant	to	food	
safety	and	pest	and	disease	risk	to	animal	health,	we	might	have	been	casting	the	net	too	
wide.			
	
Applying	this	approach	to	the	data	on	STCs	arising	in	both	the	TBT	and	SPS	Committees	
we	find	that	measures	that	actually	ሺor	allegedlyሻ	are	pursued	with	the	objective	of	
protecting	human	health	or	safety,	or	the	protection	of	the	environment,	very	frequently	
                                                 
25	With	respect	to	measures	taken	for	the	protection	of	plant	health,	the	footnote	to	the	provision	entitled	
‘Definitions’	in	Annex	A	of	the	SPS	Agreement	states	that	‘plant’	includes	forests	and	wild	flora.	Thus,	this	
includes	measures	taken	to	protect	forests	from	the	introduction,	entry	or	establishment	of	a	pest	
associated	with	the	import	of	a	particular	good.			Second,	measures	taken	to	prevent	or	limit	damage	
arising	from	the	entry,	establishment	or	spread	of	pests	ሺ‘territorial	risk’ሻ	are	also	relevant	to	the	
protection	of	the	environment.	One	example	are	efforts	to	prevent	the	spread	of	‘invasive	alien	species’,	
that	is,	species	whose	introduction	and/or	spread	outside	their	natural	past	or	present	distribution	would	
threaten	biological	diversity.		Indeed,	according	to	the	Convention	on	Biological	Diversity,	alien	species	
that	become	invasive	are	considered	to	be	the	main	direct	driver	of	biodiversity	loss	across	the	globe. 
Arguably,	there	is	some	overlap	–	or	at	least	a	grey	line	–	between	the	components	of	the	SPS	definition	set	
out	in	Box	1	ሺaሻ	and	ሺdሻ.			While	it	is	possible	to	consider	biodiversity	concerns	related	to	GM	plants	or	
cross‐breeds	becoming	‘pests’	ሺby	crowding	out	endemic	speciesሻ	under	ሺdሻ	ሺ‘territorial	risk’ሻ	–	it	is	also	
possible	to	consider	these	under	ሺaሻ	–	plant/animal	health.		This	is	so	because	of	the	direct	danger	they	
pose	to	plant	or	animal	health	or	life	ሺrather	than	‘other	damage’	to	the	territory	of	a	Memberሻ.		In	either	
case,	the	environmental	relevance	of	the	measure	is	clear.			
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raise	concerns	in	both	Committees.	Indeed,	as	illustrated	in	Table	2,	taken	together,	for	
as	many	as	66%	of	all	STCs,	the	stated	objectives	of	protecting	human	health	or	safety,	
or	the	protection	of	the	environment	ሺor	bothሻ	are	at	the	root	of	the	concern	being	
addressed.			
	
Table	2:	The	share	of	STCs	where	measures	for	the	Protection	of	the	Environment	and/or	
the	Protection	of	Human	Health	or	Safety	are	addressed	ሺin	percentሻ	
	
Objective SPS TBT Both	
Env	but	not	health 25 13 19
Health	but	not	environment 48 33 40
Env	and	health 3 11 7
Neither	 24 43 34
Total	 100 100 100	
	
In	sum,	measures	that	actually	ሺor	allegedlyሻ	pursue	the	protection	of	human	health	or	
safety,	or	the	protection	of	the	environment,	very	frequently	arise	in	the	SPS	and	TBT	
Committees.		These	figures	contrast	sharply	with	the	corresponding	figures	in	the	DS	
system,	where	a	significantly	smaller	fraction	of	disputes	concern	measures	falling	
under	these	two	categories.26	
4.4 ‘Trivial’	and	‘serious’	STCs	
The	impact	of	the	STC	mechanism	clearly	depends	the	nature	of	the	issues	that	are	
addressed,	whether	they	concern	matters	that	are	more	‘trivial’	in	nature	ሺe.g.,	requests	
for	clarificationሻ,	or	more	serious	trade	conflicts.	One	likely	indication	of	the	degree	of	
‘seriousness’	of	the	subject	matters	is	the	number	of	Committee	meetings	required	to	get	
an	STC	off	the	agenda.	If	a	mere	clarification	is	requested,	or	if	there	is	a	
misunderstanding	at	the	root	of	the	concern,	this	is	likely	to	have	been	solved	the	first	
time	the	measure	was	raised,	or	at	least	the	second	time.		Indeed,	one	reason	for	
                                                 
26 See Horn, Johannesson and Mavroidis (2011). 
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categorizing	also	those	STCs	raised	in	two	meetings	as	not	serious	is	that	a	matter	raised	
for	the	first	time	may	only	be	responded	to	–	and	clarified	–	at	the	second	consecutive	
meeting,	simply	because	the	responding	Member	was	not	in	a	position	to	respond	
substantively	the	first	time	around.	On	the	other	hand,	STCs	that	require	three	or	more	
meetings	seem	likely	to	confer	a	degree	of	importance	to	the	concern	being	raised,	
indicating	that	the	STC	addresses	‘serious’	issues,	issues	beyond	pure	clarifications.		
	
In	order	to	provide	a	more	detailed	picture	of	the	number	of	meetings	during	which	
STCs	stay	on	the	agenda	of	the	Committee,	we	need	to	define	how	long	time	an	STC	
should	be	absent	from	the	agenda	in	order	for	it	to	be	assumed	to	have	permanently	
disappeared.	This	is	of	course	an	arbitrary	decision,	but	we	will	stipulate	that	an	STC	
should	not	have	been	raised	for	discussion	during	the	last	two	years	to	qualify	ሺthat	is,	
during	the	six	meetings	2011	and	2012ሻ.	Applying	this	criterion,	Figure	5	depicts	the	
number	of	STCs	that	stayed	on	the	agenda	one	meeting	only,	during	two	meetings,	etc.	
As	can	be	seen,	the	majority	of	both	SPS	and	TBT	STCs	only	require	one	or	two	meetings;	
63%	in	case	of	the	SPS	STCs	and	69%	for	TBT	STCs.	But,	more	importantly,	there	are	still	
in	absolute	numbers	many	STCs	that	address	serious	concerns,	and	that	have	
disappeared	from	the	agenda:	108	of	the	295	SPS	STCs,	78	out	of	249	TBT	STCS.		A	key	
question	we	will	revert	to	in	Section	5	is	whether	we	can	consider	these	resolved	or	not.	
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Figure	5:	The	frequency	of	the	number	of	Committee	meetings		
for	STCs	with	no	meeting	during	2011	and	2012	
 
 
4.5 Determinants	of	the	number	of	meetings	in	STCs	
What,	then,	explains	the	number	of	meetings	that	are	required?	At	least	two	factors	are	
likely	to	be	important:	the	number	of	countries	involved,	and	the	technical	and	political	
complexity	of	the	subject	matter.	There	is	readily	available	information	concerning	both	
the	number	of	concerned	Members	and	the	number	of	responding	Members.	Much	more	
difficult	is	of	course	to	assess	the	complexity	aspect.	But	it	seems	reasonable	to	
hypothesize	that	one	factor	that	add	such	complexity	is	that	the	challenged	measure	
purports	to	be	for	the	protection	of	human	health	or	safety,	or	the	protection	of	the	
environment,	are	of	a	complex	nature.		
	
In	order	to	determine	the	exact	impact	of	these	factors,	we	use	ሺrobustሻ	ordinary	least	
squares	regressions	to	estimate,	for	the	SPS	and	TBT	Committees	separately,	how	the	
 23 
 
number	of	Committee	meetings	is	explained	by	the	number	of	concerned	and	
responding	Members,	and	by	binary	variables	indicating	whether	the	protection	of	
human	health	or	safety,	or	the	protection	of	the	environment,	are	the	objectives	of	the	
contested	measures.		In	each	case	we	restrict	the	data	to	STCs	for	which	the	last	meeting	
was	2010	or	earlier,	in	order	to	allow	the	STCs	to	have	dormant	for	at	least	6	Committee	
meetings.	We	also	focus	on	‘serious’	STCs	ሺthose	with	three	or	more	meetingsሻ.	The	
outcome	is	reported	in	Appendix	3.	
	
For	both	the	SPS	and	the	TBT	STCs,	the	number	of	concerned	Members	is	significant	ሺat	
the	5%	level	for	SPS	at	1%	for	TBTሻ,	and	the	number	of	responding	Members	is	highly	
significant	for	SPS	STCs,	but	non‐significant	on	the	TBT	side.	The	estimates	suggest	that	
adding	another	concerned	Member	adds	a	third	of	a	meeting	to	the	total	number	of	SPS	
meetings	and	slightly	more	to	TBT	meetings.	Adding	another	responding	Member	has	an	
even	stronger	effect,	and	increases	the	total	number	of	SPS	meetings	with	a	half	meeting.	
We	can	hence	conclude	that	the	amount	of	resources	that	each	participating	Member	
spends	on	an	STC	seems	positively	correlated	with	the	number	of	participants	on	either	
side.		
	
Turning	to	the	impact	of	the	‘complexity’	measures,	health	is	weakly	ሺ10%	levelሻ	
significant	in	the	case	of	SPS	STCs.	However,	the	estimates	suggest	that	when	a	health	
measure	is	on	the	agenda,	the	number	of	meetings	is	almost	.7	fewer,	contrary	to	what	
we	hypothesized.	On	the	TBT	side,	health	is	again	significant	at	the	10%	level,	but	now	
adds	one	meeting	to	the	total	number	of	meetings	for	the	TBT	STCs.	Finally,	the	
environment	variable	is	significant	at	the	5%	level	for	TBT	STCs,	and	bringing	
environmental	measures	on	the	agenda	is	estimated	to	add	over	one	meeting	to	the	total	
number	of	meetings	for	a	TBT	STCs.	We	can	thus	conclude	that	there	is	mixed	support	
for	the	notion	that	SPS	or	TBT	STCs	that	involve	health	or	environment	objectives	
contribute	to	longer	STCs	through	their	inherent	technical	or	political	complexity.	27		
                                                 
27 Both variables are significant however in the TBT case, if the data also includes STCs with fewer than three 
meetings. In this case, they variables are positive, and the estimates suggest that an STC that addresses 
environmental protection or health requires slightly less than one meeting more. 
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5 The	resolution	of	STCs	
As	discussed	above,	STCs	are	not	formal	disputes;	there	are	no	judges,	and	the	SPS	and	
TBT	Committees	have	not	mandate	and	are	not	empowered	to	‘settle’	the	matters	that	
are	raised.	The	work	on	STCs	in	the	Committees	should	hence	not	be	equated	with	a	
formal	settlement	procedure.	But	it	would	be	a	rather	stringent	criterion	to	argue	that	
that	a	conflict	necessarily	has	to	go	through	the	regular	dispute	settlement	process	in	
order	to	be	classified	as	‘settled’.		The	logical	conclusion	of	the	argument	would	be	that	
only	a	limited	number	of	fully‐fledged	TBT	and	SPS	disputes	would	currently	count	as	
settled	ሺAppendix	2ሻ.		This	does	not	appear	to	capture	the	full	extent	of	such	conflict	
resolution,	however.		
	
In	the	SPS	and	TBT	Committees,	a	Member,	or	a	group	of	Members,	engage	in	a	dialogue	
with	other	Memberሺsሻ	concerning	a	specific	policy	measure;	there	is	an	exchange	of	
information	and	views,	and	concerned	Memberሺsሻ	can	rest	the	case	if	they	so	desire,	for	
instance	if	they	are	sufficiently	convinced	concerning	the	legality	of	the	measure;	or,	
they	can	request	a	change	in	the	contested	measure	–	or	in	the	light	of	explanations	and	
clarification	the	challenging	Members	may	decide	not	to	pursue	the	matter	further.	As	a	
result	of	the	information	obtained,	or	of	the	change	in	the	policy,	the	concerned	Member	
may	decide	on	its	own	that	the	matter	has	been	resolved,	even	though	similar	decisions	
are	void	of	any	formalism.	Thus,	some	form	of	settlement	takes	place	also	in	the	case	of	
STCs.		
	
In	order	to	determine	the	extent	to	which	STCs	can	be	said	to	be	settled,	we	need	to	
proceed	somewhat	differently	with	regard	to	SPS	and	TBT	STCs.		
5.1 SPS	
On	the	SPS	side,	settlements	are	officially	reported.	STCs	are	classified	as	either	as	
‘resolved’,	or	‘partially	resolved’,	or	‘not	reported’.	Members	are	encouraged	to	inform	
the	Committee	when	they	have	bilaterally	resolved	an	STC	that	has	previously	been	
brought	to	the	Committee's	attention.	STCs	are	considered	‘resolved’	where	the	two	
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parties	involved	report	to	the	Committee	that	the	issue	has	been	resolved.28		When	
several	Members	have	raised	an	STC,	it	is	counted	as	‘partially	resolved’	if	not	all	
involved	have	stated	that	it	has	been	resolved.			
	
How	did	this	practice	develop?		Three	reviews	of	the	operation	and	implementation	of	
the	SPS	Agreement	have	taken	place	so	far:	in	1999,	2005,	and	2010.29	In	the	context	of	a	
review,	the	operation	of	the	SPS	Agreement	as	a	whole	is	evaluated	ሺSTCs	are	but	one	of	
the	items	that	are	being	evaluatedሻ.		In	various	parts	of	these	reports	we	read	phrases	to	
the	effect	that	STCs	have	been	‘resolved’.	The	1999	review	reads	in	part:	
	
The	Committee	welcomed	the	fact	that	a	substantial	number	of	SPS‐related	
trade	matters	has	been	resolved	following	their	discussion	at	formal	
meetings	of	the	Committee	or	bilaterally.30	
	
…	the	Committee	noted	that	the	use	of	§12.2	could	be	an	effective	means	of	
satisfactorily	resolving	problems.31	
	
In	the	2005	review,	the	SPS	Committee	notes:	
	
The	number	of	specific	trade	concerns	raised	in	the	Committee	during	the	
years	1995‐2004	gives,	on	the	one	hand,	an	indication	of	the	number	of	
problems	ሺ204ሻ	faced	by	Members,	and	on	the	other	hand,	evidence	of	the	
increasing	use	of	the	Committee	as	a	forum	to	try	to	resolve	these	problems	
ሺ56	problems	were	reported	resolved	during	the	same	periodሻ.32	
                                                 
28 Formally, an STC is also considered resolved when the matter has gone to a DSU Panel. However, in practice 
there is not a single case where this has occurred. It can also be noted that legally it is yet not clear whether 
‘resolution’ before the Committee amounts to formal resolution to the effect that, for example, none of the 
parties can raise this matter again before a WTO Panel. But practice so far thus suggests that WTO Members 
treat ‘resolved’ issues before the SPS Committee as definitively resolved.  
 
29WTO	Docs.	G/SPS/12	of	March	11,	1999;	G/SPS/36	of	July	11,	2005;	G/SPS/53	of	May	3,	2010.			
30WTO	Doc.	G/SPS/12	at	§4.		
31WTO	Doc.	G/SPS/12	at	§24.	
32WTO	Doc.	G/SPS/36	at	§10;	see	also	§84	of	the	same	document.		
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In	similar	vein,	we	read	in	the	report	of	the	2010	review	under	the	heading.	
‘Recommendations’:	
	
Members	are	encouraged	to	make	use	of	this	opportunity	to	identify	
specific	trade	problems	and	to	seek	to	find	expeditious	and	mutually	
satisfactory	resolutions	of	these	problems.33		
	
We	thus	have	three	documents	from	the	SPS	Committee,	spanning	over	12	years,	which	
reflect	almost	identical	expressions	when	referring	to	‘settlement’	of	disputes	at	the	SPS	
Committee‐level:	this	should	be	strong	evidence	of	state	practice	to	understand	that	they	
can	‘resolve’	their	concerns	in	the	context	of	the	SPS	Committee	when	raising	them	as	
STCs.		Based	on	these	statements,	it	seems	reasonable	to	conclude	that	Members	in	the	
SPS	Committee	indeed	resolve	trade	disputes,	the	lack	of	legal	formalism	to	this	effect	
notwithstanding.	
	
Table	2a:	Resolution	of	SPS	STCs	according	to	SPS	Committee	records	
	
Status	 No	of	STCs Percent
‘Resolved’	 96 28
‘Partially	resolved’ 18 5
‘Not	reported’ 230 28
Total	 344 100
	
Turning	to	the	numbers,	Table	2a	shows	the	frequency	and	fraction	of	the	three	status	
categories.	As	shown,	a	significant	proportion,	or	28%,	of	the	344	SPS	STCs	are	reported	
as	resolved,	another	5%	are	partially	resolved,	while	there	is	no	report	for	67%	of	the	
STCs.	As	we	will	argue	next	however,	we	believe	that	we	can	gain	further	insight	into	the	
                                                 
33WTO	Doc.	G/SPS/52	at	§94.	
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extent	to	which	trade	disputes	are	resolved	by	adjusting	the	definition	of	when	an	STC	
should	be	considered	to	be	resolved.				
	
Table	2a	includes	all	STCs.	But	since	we	are	interested	in	STCs	that	reflect	some	form	of	
conflict	between	Members,	we	use	the	criterion	for	a	STC	to	be	assumed	to	be	serious,	
discussed	in	Section	4.4,	and	focus	on	STCs	that	have	been	raised	in	at	least	three	
Committee	meetings.	As	can	be	seen	from	Table	2b,	the	share	of	STCs	that	are	reported	
as	resolved	is	substantially	higher	for	serious	STCs	than	for	non‐serious	STCs.		
	
Table	2b:	Resolution	of	SPS	STCs	according	to	SPS	Committee	records	
for	STCs	lasting	three	or	more	Committee	meetings	ሺi.e.,	‘serious’	STCsሻ	
	
Status	 No	of	STCs Percent	of	all 123 	
‘Resolved’	 46 37.4
‘Partially	resolved’ 14 11.4
‘Not	reported’	 63 51.2
Total	no	of	‘serious’ 123 100
	
A	second	adjustment,	sticking	with	the	’serious’	concerns	ሺ123ሻ,	would	be	to	consider	
STCs	as	resolved	even	though	they	have	been	reported	as	only	partially	resolved,	or	not	
reported	at	all,	if	they	have	been	inactive	for	a	certain	length	time.	The	reason	for	such	
an	adjustment	is	that	it	is	commonplace	in	the	WTO	that	the	resolution	of	trade	conflicts	
is	not	reported;	for	instance,	a	significant	number	of	DSU	disputes	die	out	before	panels	
are	established,	and	without	any	notification	of	a	Mutually	Agreed	Solution.	One	
indication	why	such	an	adjustment	may	be	reasonable	is	the	fact	that	for	the	221	SPS	
STCs	which	have	been	discussed	in	one	or	two	meetings,	76%	are	listed	as	‘Not	
 28 
 
reported’,	whereas	SPS	STCs	that	have	lasted	for	three	or	more	meetings	ሺthe	‘serious	
concerns’ሻ	the	numbers	are	significantly	lower,	or	51%	out	of	the	63	STCs.34			
	
In	order	to	determine	the	fraction	of	the	serious	SPS	STCs	that	plausibly	are	resolved	
despite	having	being	reported	as	either	‘partially	resolved’	or	‘Not	reported’	we	employ	
the	criterion	discussed	in	Section	4.4,	which	assumes	that	an	STC	has	been	resolved	if	it	
has	not	have	been	raised	for	discussion	during	2011	or	2012.	With	this	adjustment,	the	
fraction	of	resolved	STCs	will	clearly	increase	further.	Table	2c	depicts	the	implications	
of	applying	this	criterion	to	the	123	‘serious’	SPS	STCs	ሺi.e.,	the	STCs	that	have	been	
addressed	in	at	least	three	meetingsሻ.	In	addition	to	the	46	‘serious’	SPS	STCs	that	are	
resolved	according	to	the	Committee	records,	14	‘Partially	resolved’	and	49	‘Not	
reported’	STCs	have	not	been	raised	during	2011	and	2012,	and	are	therefore	assumed	
to	also	be	resolved.	Hence,	88%	of	the	123	‘serious’	SPS	STCs	would	be	considered	as	
resolved	according	to	this	metric.35	
	
Table	2c:	Assessed	resolution	of	SPS	STCs	lasting	three		
or	more	Committee	meetings	ሺi.e.,	‘serious’	STCsሻ		
	
Status	 No	of	STCs Percent	of	all	123	serious	STCs	
‘Resolved’	according	to	Committee	records ሺofficialሻ 46 42.6	
‘Partially	resolved’ and	not	raised	in	2011‐2012 14 12.0	
‘Not	reported’	and	not	raised	in	2011‐2012 49 45,4	
Total	 108 87.8	
	
                                                 
34 Indeed, looking at STCs with one meeting only, 116 out of 137, or 85%, are listed as “Not reported”. One 
plausible explanation for the considerably lower frequency for reported resolutions for STCs that have been 
raised only in one or two meetings may be that the subject matters of these STCS are not viewed as important 
enough to merit further engagement. 
 
35 The fact that the 123 STCs include 3 that were initiated during 2011 and 2012 implies that the rate of 
settlement is slightly underestimated. 
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5.2 TBT	
On	the	TBT	side	it	is	more	difficult	to	assess	whether	STCs	are	settled,	since	there	is	no	
official	record	for	settlement.	36	Currently,	the	official	record	indicates	‘Not	Reported’	as	
the	current	status	for	all	TBT	STCs.		But	there	is	no	a	priori	reason	why	Members	could	
not	reach	a	similar	degree	of	convergence	regarding	measures	discussed	before	the	TBT	
Committee.		In	fact,	the	Committee	itself	has	underlined	how	the	discussions	on	STCs	
enhance	the	transparency	of	TBT	measures,	and	that	this	multilateral	review	of	
measures	has		
	
…effectively	facilitated	the	resolution	of	–	or	diffused	at	an	early	stage	–	
issues	arising	between	Members	relating	to	specific	trade	concerns.37		
	
There	are	therefore	very	good	reasons	to	believe	that	also	TBT	STCs	often	get	settled.	
	
In	order	to	assess	the	proportion	of	TBT	STCs	that	can	reasonably	be	assumed	to	be	
resolved,	we	impose	the	same	two	requirements	that	were	used	above	for	SPS	STCs.	
Hence,	to	confer	‘seriousness’	we	count	TBT	STCs	that	have	been	raised	in	three	or	more	
meetings;	148	of	the	366	TBT	STCs	are	‘serious’	according	to	this	classification.	Among	
these,	78	STCs	have	not	been	reverted	to	in	the	last	six	meetings	ሺtwo	yearsሻ.	Hence,	
53%	of	all	serious	TBT	STCs	would,	according	to	this	count,	be	assumed	to	have	been	
resolved.		
	
Needless	to	say,	the	method	we	employ	for	determining	whether	the	STCs	are	settled	is	
crude,	and	the	numbers	are	therefore	not	to	be	taken	literally.	We	nevertheless	believe	
that	the	basic	message	they	convey	–	that	a	significant	number	of	serious	matters	are	
discussed	and	settled	in	the	SPS	and	TBT	Committees	–	is	correct.		
                                                 
36The difference between the two agreements in this respect is remarkable, but we have still not found any 
persuasive explanation of the discrepancy.  
37 WTO Doc. G/TBT/26, paragraph 65. 
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6 Discussion	
The	SPS	and	TBT	Committees	have	since	1995	addressed	several	hundreds	of	STCs	each.	
In	the	above,	we	have	examined	a	large	number	of	facets	of	these	STCs,	which	has	led	to	
a	number	of	findings	and	conclusions.			
	
First,	at	least	a	third	of	the	STCs	can	be	presumed	to	have	addressed	trade	conflicts	
between	Members,	that	is,	matters	that	go	beyond	mere	clarification	and	information,	
since	they	been	raised	at	several	meetings	ሺwe	have	used	three	meetings	as	a	proxy	for	
‘seriousness’ሻ.		
	
Second,	it	appears	as	if	the	transparency	mechanisms	of	the	TBT	Committee	–	its	
notifications	mechanism	–	has	been	conducive	to	enabling	Members	to	identify	sources	
of	potential	concern:		the	number	of	TBT	STCs	raised	in	the	Committee	has,	over	time,	
been	strongly	correlated	with	the	number	TBT	notifications,	suggesting	that	the	latter	
have	served	as	sources	of	information	behind	the	STCs.		Somewhat	surprisingly,	a	
similar	correlation	cannot	be	found	on	the	SPS	side.			
	
Third,	very	few	STCs	go	to	formal	dispute	settlement.		While	claims	under	the	SPS	and	
TBT	Agreements	are	referred	to	40	and	45	DSU	disputes,	respectively,	these	same	
agreements	have,	overall,	been	at	the	core	of	only	a	limited	number	of	disputes.			
Furthermore,	the	number	of	DSU	disputes	in	general,	as	well	as	SPS	and	TBT	disputes,	
have	tended	to	decline	over	time	–	although	2012	did	see	an	upward	spike.			
	
Finally,	for	SPS,	37%	of	the	STCs	that	we	have	classified	as	‘serious’	have	officially	been	
reported	as	resolved.	However,	under	the	plausible	assumption	that	disputes	are	
resolved	if	the	last	meeting	in	which	they	were	raised	was	2010	or	earlier,	the	vast	
majority	of	‘serious’	SPS	STCs	would	be	classified	as	resolved.	And	while	there	is	no	such	
official	record	for	the	TBT	side,	corresponding	calculations	suggest	that	more	than	half	
of	‘serious’	TBT	STCs	have	been	resolved.	These	calculations	obviously	do	not	purport	to	
show	the	exact	extent	of	trade	conflict	resolution	in	the	two	Committees,	but	we 
nevertheless believe that the basic message they convey – that a significant number of serious 
matters are discussed and settled in the SPS and TBT Committees – is correct.		
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Unlike	many	other	WTO	Committees,	work	in	the	SPS	and	TBT	Committees	is	
remarkably	technical	in	nature,	and	the	delegations	frequently	rely	on	experts	from	
capitals.	Discussions	do	not	normally	gravitate	towards	politics,	as	in	other	areas	of	the	
WTO	negotiations,	nor	do	they	become	exceeding	legalistic,	as	in	formal	disputes	
settlement.	Indeed,	only	rarely	do	Ambassadors	intervene	and	the	Committees	are	
normally	chaired	by	second‐level	Geneva‐based	diplomats.		As	a	result,	and	because	of	
the	said	technical	nature	of	the	issues	on	the	table,	the	trade	concerns	are	often	
discussed	more	on	their	intellectual	merits	than	as	quid	pro	quo	in	a	wider	trade	game.38	
Another	plausible	reason	for	the	success	rate	is	the	fact	that	raising	an	STC	in	the	SPS	or	
TBT	Committee	is	not	akin	to	litigating	before	a	Panel:	opinions	expressed	will	not	be	
held	binding	on	those	expressing	them,	and	hence	those	participating	can	adopt	a	more	
liberal	language	when	illuminating	aspects	of	the	contested	measures.		
	
To	conclude,	the	TBT	and	SPS	Committees	do	not	resolve	trade	concerns	in	a	formal,	
legal	sense	ሺthis	is,	in	any	case,	not	their	mandateሻ.	But	the	analysis	above	suggests	that	
the	Committees	nevertheless	provide	what	appears	to	be	a	well‐functioning	mechanism	
to	address	a	broad	range	of	non‐tariff	related	trade	concerns	coming	under	their	
purview,	and	that	both	Committees	contribute	in	a	quantitatively	important	fashion	to	
diffuse	trade	tensions	in	their	respective	areas.		This	important,	but	seemingly	less	well	
known,	form	of	conflict	resolution	is	conducted	in	the	shadow	of	formal	adjudication	in	
the	Dispute	Settlement	system.	
	
	
                                                 
38Wolfe	ሺ2013ሻ	concludes	along	the	same	lines.		
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Appendix	1:	Classification	of	participants	in	STCs	in	country	groups	
	
G2:	EU,	USA	
	
IND:	Australia,	Bulgaria,	Canada,	Croatia,	Czech	Republic,	Estonia,	Hong	Kong,	Hungary,	
Iceland,	Israel,	Japan,	Latvia,	Mexico,	New	Zealand,	Norway,	Poland,	Romania,	Singapore,	
Slovak	Republic,	Slovenia,	South	Korea,	Switzerland,	Turkey	
	
BRIC:	Brazil,	China,	India,	Russian	Federation	
	
DEV:	Albania,	Arab	Emirates,	Argentina,	Armenia,	Bahrain,	Barbados,	Belize,	Bolivia,	
Botswana,	Cameroon,	Cape	Verde,	Chile,	Chinese	Taipei,	Colombia,	,	Costa	Rica,	Cuba,	
Côte	d'Ivoire,	Dominica,	Dominican	Republic,	Ecuador,	Egypt,	El	Salvador,	Fiji,	Gabon,	
Guatemala,	Honduras,	Indonesia,	Jamaica,	Jordan,	Kenya,	Kuwait,	Macedonia,	Malaysia,	
Mauritius,	Moldova,	Morocco,	Nicaragua,	Nigeria,	Oman,	Pakistan,	Panama,	Papua	New	
Guinea,	Paraguay,	Peru,	Philippines,	Qatar,	Saint	Vincent	and	the	Grenadines,	Saudi	
Arabia,		
South	Africa,	Sri	Lanka,	Suriname,	Thailand,	Trinidad	and	Tobago,	Tunisia,	Ukraine,	
Uruguay,	Venezuela,	Viet	Nam,	Zimbabwe	
	
LDC:	Benin,	Burundi,	Gambia,	Malawi,	Mozambique,	Senegal,	Tanzania,	Uganda,	Zambia	
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Appendix	2:	‘Fully‐fledged’	TBT	and	SPS	Disputes	
	
Since	the	entry	into	force	of	both	the	SPS	and	TBT	Agreements	up	until	the	end	of	
2012,	45	cases	cite	the	TBT	Agreement	in	their	request	for	consultations	and	40	cases	
cite	the	SPS	Agreement	in	their	request	for	consultation.39		However,	it	is	not	possible	to	
tell	from	these	numbers	how	central	the	claims	under	TBT	and/or	SPS	were	to	each	of	
these	disputes.		Indeed,	in	some	cases,	these	claims	may	not	have	been	pursued	at	all	by	
Panels	or	Appellate	Body;	in	other	cases	may	have	been	tangential	to	the	core	issue.		In	
other	instances,	a	Panel	may	not	have	been	established,	or	the	matter	may	have	been	
settled	or	terminated	without	any	information	provided	–	and	the	relevance	and/or	
importance	of	these	two	Agreements	is	therefor	note	possible	to	establish.		Thus	the	
following	table	lists	what	we	deem	to	me	a	narrower	sub‐set	of	disputes	that	we	label:	
‘fully‐fledged’	TBT	and	SPS	disputes.		In	this	count	we	include:	ሺiሻ	those	disputes	where	
Panel	and/or	Appellate	Body	Reports	have	been	issued40;	and	ሺiiሻ	where	the	findings	are	
concentrated	on	either	SPS	or	TBT.			We	thus	count	5	TBT	and	11	SPS	’fully‐fledged’	
disputes.	
	
#	 Title	and	complainant	 Complainant	and	date	of	
Consultation	Request	
ሺreverse	chronological	
orderሻ
Dispute
1	 TBT	 US	–	Clove	Cigarettes	ሺIndonesiaሻ
United	States‐Measures	Affecting	the	Production	and	Sale	of	
Clove	Cigarettes	
7	April	2010 DS406
2	 TBT	 US	–	COOL	ሺMexicoሻ	
United	States—Certain	Country	of	Origin	Labelling	ሺCoolሻ	
Requirements
17	December	2008	 DS386
	
3	 TBT	 US	–	COOL	ሺCanadaሻ	
United	States—Certain	Country	of	Origin	Labelling	ሺCoolሻ	
Requirements
1	December	2008	 DS384	
4	 TBT	 US	—	Tuna	II	ሺMexicoሻ	
United	States—Measures	Concerning	the	Importation,	
Marketing	and	Sale	of	Tuna	and	Tuna	Products
24	October	2008	 DS381
5	 TBT	 EC	–	Sardines	ሺPeruሻ	
European	Communities	—	Trade	Description	of	Sardines 20	March	2001	 DS231
	
1	 SPS	 US	–	Poultry	ሺChinaሻ	
United	States	—	Certain	Measures	Affecting	Imports	of	
Poultry	from	China	
17	April	2009	 DS392
2	 SPS	 Australia	–	Apples	ሺNew	Zealandሻ 31	August	2007	 DS367
                                                 
39 A full listing of these cases can be found on the WTO website under "Disputes by Agreement". 
40 Disputes currently ‘in the pipeline’ (where no Panel  and/or AB report has been adopted) that may become 
‘fully-fledged’ TBT or SPS disputes are therefore not counted here. 
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Australia	—Measures	Affecting	the	Importation	of	Apples	
from	New	Zealand	ሺComplainant:	New	Zealandሻ
3	 SPS	 EC	–	Approval	and	Marketing	of	Biotech	Products	
ሺArgentinaሻ	
European	Communities	—	Measures	Affecting	the	Approval	
and	Marketing	of	Biotech	Products
14	May	2003	 DS293
4	 SPS	 EC	—	Approval	and	Marketing	of	Biotech	Products	ሺCanadaሻ
European	Communities	—	Measures	Affecting	the	Approval	
and	Marketing	of	Biotech	Products
13	May	2003	 DS292
5	 SPS	 EC	—	Approval	and	Marketing	of	Biotech	Products	ሺUnited	
Statesሻ	
European	Communities	—	Measures	Affecting	the	Approval	
and	Marketing	of	Biotech	Products
13	May	2003	 DS291
6	 SPS	 Japan	–	Apples	ሺUnited	Statesሻ	
Japan	—	Measures	Affecting	the	Importation	of	Apples 1	March	2002	 DS245
7	 SPS	 Japan	–	Agricultural	Products	II	ሺUnited	Statesሻ
Japan	—	Measures	Affecting	Agricultural	Products 7	April	1997 DS76
8	 SPS	 EC	–	Hormones	ሺCanadaሻ	
European	Communities	—	Measures	Concerning	Meat	and	
Meat	Products	ሺHormonesሻ	
28	July	1996 DS48
9	 SPS	 EC	–	Hormones	ሺUnited	Statesሻ
European	Communities	—	Measures	Concerning	Meat	and	
Meat	Products	ሺHormonesሻ	
26	January	1996	 DS26
10	 SPS	 Australia		‐	Salmonoids	ሺUnited	Statesሻ
Australia	—Measures	Affecting	the	Importation	of	
Salmonids	
20	November	1995	 DS21
11	 SPS	 Australia	–	Salmon	ሺCanadaሻ	
Australia	—Measures	Affecting	Importation	of	Salmon 5	October	1995	 DS18
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Appendix	3:	The	regression	reported	in	Section	5	
	
OLS	regressions	are	run	for	the	SPS	and	TBT	Committees	separately,	with	the	
number	of		meetings	ሺ#	Meetingsሻ	as	dependent	variable,	and	with	the	number	of	
concerned	Members	ሺ#	Concernedሻ,	the	number	of	responding	Members	ሺ#	Respondሻ,	
dummy	variables	for	protection	of	human	health	or	safety	ሺHealthሻ	and	protection	of	the	
environment	ሺEnvሻ,	as	exogenous	variables.	The	data	is	restricted	to	the	period	1995‐
2010,	and	to	STCs	with	3	or	more	meetings.	The	results	are	given	in	the	table	below,	
where	the	first	column	pertains	to	SPS	STCs	and	the	second	to	TBT	STCs.		
	
	
 SPS TBT 
VARIABLES # Meetings # Meetings 
   
# Concerned 0.300** 0.405*** 
 (0.120) (0.130) 
# Respond 0.477*** -0.0888 
 (0.137) (0.481) 
Env -0.397 1.117** 
 (0.408) (0.524) 
Eealth -0.685* 0.994* 
 (0.354) (0.516) 
Constant 3.450*** 2.919*** 
 (0.435) (0.524) 
   
Observations 108 78 
R-squared 0.205 0.221 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
	
